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S. Iagodzinskyi 
“LANGUAGE-GAME” IN SOCIAL NETWORKS’ SPACE 
Brilliance bears temporal character. Very often it happens so, that especially genius people work out a 
methodology that becomes an effective way to understand new phenomena in the future. L. Wittgenstein’s 
personality appears to be one of these. “Language-game” conception developed by him still takes an 
important place in philosophical investigations. It is commonly known, that L.Wittgenstein firstly used the 
term “language-game” in “Philosophical Investigations” which were published in 1953. In course of time he 
changed the understanding of this conception, but the key idea remained the same: when sense impinges 
upon the language, it multiplies absurdity. [Витгенштейн Л. Философские исследования // 
Философские работы. Часть І. Пер. с нем. – М., 1994. – С. 129]. L.Wittgenstein agrees with the 
representatives of analytic philosophy concerning the priority of languages above phenomena. Later on he 
discovers the question of method and transforms indignation into the instrument for analysis.  
Being a junior school teacher, the researcher noticed that the studying process is much more effective 
when it includes language components. One of the first definitions come out of this basic notions: I will call 
“language-game” a single unity: actions which the language is connected with [The same source. – P. 83]. 
Any language-game must have a naming procedure, that is analogous to the original location of draughts on 
the table. Irrevocably, it is determined by certain rules and norms, but names for things are given voluntarily 
and the only present criterion here is participants’ convention. With due time, W.V.O.Quine made a 
conclusion, that phenomena’s divisions into a name and an object certainly end in a stage, when “massive 
manufacture of general terms… significantly exceeds the amount of existing objects” [Куайн У.О. Слова и 
объект // Новое в зарубежной лингвистике. Вып. 18, 1989. – С. 79]. Especially this provokes the 
occurrence of language-games in a definite kinds of practices. L. Wittgenstein’s justifies a conclusion, that 
there is no sense talking about a dominant language-game. The only thing that might be thought – is the 
existence of different games’ “families”. 
With the development of programming languages, appearance of calculation machines, development of 
formalized systems, L. Wittgenstein’s philosophical ideas took backseat. In the 50-90ies of XX century they 
seemed to be utopian and out-of-date. Mankind started to use identical, standardized ways of procession 
and transmission of information. Researches became interested in everyday and natural languages less and 
less. Its cognitive, sociocultural and methodological potential was considered to be not enough for a social 
progress. A famous scientist A. Tarski continuously confirmed, that everyday language is contradictory, 
that’s why its formalization is quite difficult. In opposition to this, L. Wittgenstein didn’t limit his work only to 
the solution of practical tasks, but tried to present the “language-game” conception as a universal 
methodological instruction, that should “bring to the consciousness a unique variety of language tools and 
ways of their usage, fight with the stereotypes, that the language always works identically and serves for 
identical reasons”. [Козлова М.С. Идея „языковых игр” // Философские идеи Людвига Витгенштейна / 
Под ред. М.С. Козловой. – М., 1996. – С. 16]. That is why language-games are considered by him as “life’s 
forms”, the varieties of which are determined by the life’s wealth and kinds of human practices.  
Giving a characteristic to such an approach, N. Chomsky emphasizes that here, genesis of the 
language is seen not as a practical problem (this typically occurs with constructed languages), but as “a way 
of doing a numerous number of individual creative activities” [Хомский Н. Картезианская лингвистика. 
Глава из истории рационалистической мысли: Пер. с англ.– М., 2005. – С. 54]. Unfortunately, this idea 
didn’t get a wide recognition among linguists. Only on the edge of the 21 century, it became widely known, 
that an individual, who lives in the information era, doesn’t want to limit his/her communicative activities to 
simple programming languages. The task of the software developers – to transmit “life forms” into virtual 
area, saving to the maximum its attributes and here the common language and “language-games” that 
function in it, become indispensable tools.  
 
 
 
 
The secret of L. Wittgenstein’s philosophical intuition is that he didn’t stop on the conflict between 
common language means and requests to it. The scientist believed that accuracy and strictness of 
formalized languages – is a unique illusion. “Language-games” are “certain models, that… are called upon to 
enlighten the possibilities of our language” [L. Wittgenstein. – Afore-referenced work. – P. 131]. “Language-
games” give a possibility to overcome the communication problem between I and Somebody Else in the 
virtual space of social networks. L. Wittgenstein, who couldn’t foresee their appear in the 21 century, 
believed that “language-games” lead to the unity of thought and reality. Such model of information space is 
built now in the Internet. A thought, action, reality and life emerged into one communicative action, where 
common language plays a dominant role. It became apparent that any language simplification doesn’t meet 
the demands of the society. Moreover, the flexibility of a natural language guarantees the wide spread of 
innovative technologies, their integration into the real social space.  
Value of L. Wittgenstein’s philosophy is that he developed the notion “networks of understanding”. He 
showed, that a real language can’t be defined only by the laws of syntax, as it immediately turns into 
abstraction. For a language not to lose its functions, we should take into account its semantic and pragmatic 
aspects and only then a natural language will simulate general principles and structure of any constructed 
language. It will turn into a certain “network”, that constructs reality in any variations of social space, 
including virtual. To B.V. Grygoriev’s opinion, the natural language in comparison with constructed 
languages is objective. [Григорьев Б.В. Проблемы интерпретации. – М., 1997. – С. 27]. It doesn’t ignore 
the peculiarities of the real world, being a part of it. Moreover, it can be interpreted very seldom, that’s why it 
takes a role of an intersubjective beginning of any simulation.  
On the contrary, common language includes metaphors, analogies, comparison, the origin of which 
cannot be explained. A logical question arises: can a natural language be the bearer of sense in the content 
where the author is absent? A message in the network, commentary, summary very often become 
impersonal, losing the direct connection with the author, and turning into an intertext. Here “language-
games” start acting actively. A message evokes a lot of responses, comparison, checks, confirmations, 
contradictions and questions. If during his youth, L. Wittgenstein dreamt to create an ideal, single, complete, 
logical language, in his latest years he changed his understanding of the language. The language starts to 
be an unfinished, open system, where rules transform according to the new norms of the language function. 
We consider, that such approach gave L. Wittgenstein’s philosophy a long life and interest of modern 
philosophers and scientists to his personality. Taking into account, that his ideas are productive while 
analyzing virtual social networks as well, we can undoubtedly talk about the formation of Wittgenstein’s 
paradigm in the modern philosophy.  
 
